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Public tendering implies the free concurrence and competition of bidding companies 
that certify their solvency, so that those companies proposing the most attractive bid, 
both technically and economically, are awarded the contracts and carry them out 
according to the same terms and conditions that they proposed.  Generally, there is high 
competition in public tendering, both concerning the number of bidders (constantly 
increasing), as well as the profit margin (constantly decreasing).  On the other side, 
handling the procurement process, there is a contracting authority that spends public 
money while trying to fulfill a particular socio-economic objective.  This paper will 
take the contracting authority’s (auctioneer’s) point of view which is in charge of 
devising and implementing the awarding criteria, as well as choosing the best bidder.  
Particularly, this paper will focus on some aspects of the Economic Scoring Formula 
(ESF) design.  The ESF constitutes a set of mathematical expressions that transform the 
economic bids submitted by the bidders into scores, so that, eventually, the bidders can 
be ranked and the best one selected.  We will conclude that, despite apparently simple, 
how ESF are configured eventually have profound consequences on bidding behavior 
and some bidding results, like a higher or lower bid dispersion. 
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1 BACKGROUND 
In the European Union, the principal law for Public Procurement is the Directive 2004/18/EC, 
also called the Public Procurement Directive.  According to this Directive, any public contract 
should be awarded as a function of objective criteria which assure the compliance of principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination, and equal treatment, and simultaneously guarantee the 
contracts are evaluated on conditions of effective competition (Constantino et al. 2010).  The 
result is two basic awarding criteria mechanisms: the Lowest Price (LP), and the Most 
Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT).  
Generally, LP is used when the goal is to maximize savings, given that the solution is highly 
defined, while MEAT criteria are appropriate for complex projects whose contract objectives are 
variable.  In the MEAT awarding mechanism, it is common to find sub criteria of valuation such 
as:  Project duration and delivery time, operational cost, cost effectiveness, quality, aesthetics, 
characteristics and functions of environmental fashion, technical or innovative merit, post-sales 
service, guarantee period extensions, technical assistance, etc. (Pastor et al. 2010).  
In Operational Research contexts, those tenders that include different awarding criteria are 
denominated ‘multi-attribute (reverse) auctions’.  However, this type of auctions exactly 
doi: 10.14455/ISEC.res.2017.73
Pellicer, E., Adam, J. M., Yepes, V., Singh, A., and Yazdani, S. (eds.) 
 
2 
coincides with what the Directive 2004/18/EC names Most Economically Advantageous Tender 
(MEAT) (Perng et al. 2006; Bergman and Lundberg 2013), also known as ‘Best Value 
Construction Auctions’ (Molenaar and Johnson 2003, El Wardani et al. 2006) in the US. 
The leap and conceptual differences between mono-attribute (Lowest Price) auctions and 
multi-attribute auctions is, however, quite significant, as accepts that the awardee can be a bidder 
whose bid is not necessarily the lowest increases the expectations of the companies that develop 
products with high quality/price relations (best value) (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2010). 
Currently, there is a vast scientific literature regarding the creation of decision making 
frameworks that identify potential bidders and contractors as more or less acceptable (Bergman 
and Lundberg 2013).  In this sense, multiple studies have focused on generating the most 
opportune hierarchies possible, in order to ‘objectively’ classify the bidders proposals (e.g. Hong 
2004, Abudayyeh et al. 2007, Tsai et al. 2007), although much remains to be done in this area, 
the mathematical configuration of the Economic Scoring Formula is generally neglected. 
Likewise, many studies have analyzed the economic behavior of bidders in reverse auctions 
(in auction theory and game theory, for instance), but not in multi-attribute auctions.  In this 
sense, the mono-attribute reverse auctions constitute a simplification of a competition because 
contracts are awarded based on a single purely economic criterion:  the lowest bid (Skitmore 
2002).  In multi-attribute auctions we need to provide the bidders with scores so that we can, not 
just ‘rank/order’ them, but also scored them.  And ‘scores’ are needed otherwise there is no way 
to add up different criteria to decide who is the best bidder.  
Therefore, the difference between auctions and multi-attribute auctions is not simply that a 
tender involves the weighing of non-economic criteria:  economic criteria themselves are also 
transformed, and must be homogenously measured against other evaluation criteria (Abudayyeh 
et al. 2007).  Of particular interest here, is the Economic Scoring Formula, which is in charge of 
transforming into scores the economic bids submitted by the bidders in a multi-attribute auction. 
 
2 ECONOMIC SCORING FORMULA (ESF) 
The conversion of price, technical and quality factors into an overall score is absolutely 
dependent on these two factors (Abudayyeh et al. 2007, Drew et al. 2002): 
x The weights we put in each of those items or categories (mostly economic and technical) 
x The mathematical formulae used for transforming into scores each proposal item (ditto). 
In fact, one of the significant reasons why multiple criteria decision methods have been 
applied in bidding is that subsequent sensitivity analysis show that in many cases, the final order 
of the proposals is highly permutable according to small changes in the mathematical criteria 
and/or the weighting factors (Abudayyeh et al. 2007, Tsai et al. 2007). 
The Economic Scoring Formula (ESF) is defined by Ballesteros-Perez (2015b) as the set of 
mathematical expressions that allows for a numerical score to be assigned to each bidder based on 
their financial proposal, including a cut-off limit (Abnormally Low Bids Criterion, ALBC) below 
which a bid is disqualified for being too low (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015c).  Recently, 
Ballesteros-Perez et al. (2015b, 2016) studied how different configuration aspects of the ESF 
affect bidders’ behavior.  The major outcomes from that piece of research highlight that the 
following configurations of ESF promote higher bidding aggressiveness and bid dispersion: 
x Higher weight of the economic criterion (We) vs the weight of the technical proposal (Wt) 
x A lenient or even inexistent ALBC (very small number of bidders or even none are ruled 
out for being too cheap) 
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x Concave-shaped ESF vs linear or Convex-shaped ESF (bidders scores decrease faster 
than with a linear gradient when they gain distance from the lowest bid) 
These aspects are of great interest when a contracting authority designs an ESF, since how 
these scoring criteria are set will directly affect the bidders’ strategy and the bids submitted. 
 
3 SCORING PARAMETERS (SP) 
In order to apply an Economic Scoring Formula or an Abnormally Low Bids Criterion, it is 
necessary to express these in terms of one or several variables.  These variables are called 
‘Scoring Parameters (SP)’, which are, at the same time, a series of parameters describing the 
economic bidding results (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015a). 
The most common SP is the lowest bid (bmin).  In fact, in most public procurement laws, 
including Directive 2004/18/EC, it is obligatory that the lowest bid also has the best score, 
otherwise the essence in the selection of the Most Economically Advantageous Tender is lost.  
However, there are many possible combinations of SPs under a ESF, Figure 1 shows some of 
them.  Particularly, in Figure 1 it is easy to find that to create an ESF (or a ALBC) one SP can be 
chosen (Cases 1 and 5), various SPs can be chosen (Cases 2,3,4,6), or even none chosen (case 7). 
 
   
   
 
 
ib : Economic (monetary) bid submitted by bidder i. 
ikS : Score received by bidder i with ESF k (in per-unit). 
)()()1( ...,,...,, Navg SSS : Score obtained by the lowest bidder (1), the average 
bid (avg.) and the most expensive (N), respectively. 
minmax ,, bbb m : The most expensive bid, the mean or average bid and the 
lowest bid found in an auction. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
(4) (5) (6) 
(7) 
 
 
Figure 1.  Possible combinations of SP in ESF. 
 
However, ESFs do not have to implement only linear criteria.  Contracting authorities have 
freedom to generate the mathematical expressions that they consider appropriate to score the bids 
(higher-order polynomials instead of straight lines or even composite functions like cases 2, 3 and 
6 from Figure 1).  Unfortunately, it is very common that contracting authorities do not reflect on 
the consequences that a particular ESF generates on the bidders’ behavior.  This is determined not 
only by the form of the employed curves, but also by the SPs used in them. 
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4 ESF WITH NO SP 
On some occasions, an ESF can be mathematically expressed only as a function of the bidders’ 
bids bi.  The use of no SP makes the score of each bidder totally independent from the bids 
submitted by its competitors, which also means that the exact score that each bid will obtain is 
known beforehand (before the proposals submission). An example of these ESF would be Eq. (1): 
> @babSba
bbS iiii ,01 tt
                             (1) 
Where Si is the economic score obtained by bidder i who submitted a bid bi, a is the lower bid 
limit below which a bidder will not increase its score anymore, whereas b is the upper bid limit 
above which a bidder will always get a score of zero.  As can be deduced, the auctioneer or 
contracting authority needs to decide which will be the a and b values for each auction, as each 
construction work has a different economic size. 
These ESFs, however, are not very common.  The advantage of these ESF is that all bidders 
know from the outset the score that it will be obtained as a function of their bid.  Also, the score 
each bidder gets is not variable depending of what the rest of the bidders do. 
Concerning disadvantages:  these ESF with no SP tend to promote an accumulation of bids 
close to the position of a, since all bidders feel compelled to take higher risks and lower their bids 
(even to unrealistic limits) when they know exactly how much score they will get in return.  A 
second big disadvantage is that these ESF are the most vulnerable to the Phony economic bid 
weighting (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015b). 
 
5 PHONY ECONOMIC BID WEIGHTING 
Phony economic bid weighting occurs when the stated value of the economic bid versus the 
technical proposal does not match with reality.  This phenomenon is unavoidable for ESF without 
SP, but it is also possible (and indeed common) with ESF with one or more SP when they are 
carelessly designed.  Essentially, phony economic bid weightings occur in two occasions: 
x When the ESF gives away a proportion of the score, no matter how high or low the bid is, 
that is, when all bidders earn a percentage of the economic score by default. 
x When either the highest scores or the lowest scores are not usually populated by any bid, 
that is, when most of the bids just concentrate in a relatively narrow range of bid values, 
causing that all of them have very close scores too. 
The general expression for calculating the ‘true’ economic bid weighting when the weight of 
the technical bid is complementary to the economic bid (Wt=1-We) is: 
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The meaning of Eq. (2) variables can be found below and a representation in Figure 2. 
 
We: is the original (phony) Economic Bid Weighting (in /1 values) stated in the tender specs. 
We*: is the true Economic Bid Weighting (in /1 values) with We*≤We always. 
Q: is the Fraction of the Economic Score either rarely or almost always achievable (in /1 values). 
Wt: is the original Technical Bid Weighting (in /1 values) stated in the tender specs. 
Wt*: is the true Technical Bid Weighting (in /1 values) with Wt*=1-We*. 
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Curves represent 
Q values
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Figure 2.  Calculation of the True economic and technical bid weightings (Y axes) as a function of the 
initial Phony economic and technical bid weightings (X axes). 
 
This phenomenon acquires more relevance when the phony weights are used intentionally to 
force the award to a specific bidder.  In these cases, bidders’ scores differ very little in many 
transcendent criteria (because they have phony weights), and the award relies on big score 
difference (because the true weightings are high for that criterion) in an apparently irrelevant 
criterion, but where a specific bidder has some competitive advantage. 
 
6 COMPETITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SPS IMPLEMENTATION 
Despite the use of a specific SP does not have, a priori, advantage over the rest of SPs, it is 
known that there are some implications concerning how bidders will react when competing with 
that ESF.  Particularly, Table 1 summarizes the relationships between the SPs chosen and the 
consequences measured with their variation over time in subsequent auctions. 
 
Table 1.  Effects of using some SPs over the auction results. 
 
Influence over Lowest bid Mean bid Highest bid Bid st. dev.
SP used by the ESF (b min ) (b m ) (b max )  (s )
Lowest bid (b min ) ↓↓ ↓ ≈ ↓
Mean bid (b m ) ↑ ≈ ↓ ↑
Highest bid (b max ) ≈ ↓ ↓ ↑
Bid st. deviation (s ) (for ALBC) ↑↑/↑ ↑ ≈ ↑  
Legend:  ↑↑: causes a significant increase ↑: causes a minor increase ≈: no effects  
are produced ↓: causes a minor decrease ↓↓: causes a major decrease 
 
Therefore, the election of an SP is a vital aspect in the design of the ESF, given that each SP 
tends to promote different bidding strategies among the bidders.  Further qualitative and 
quantitative justification of the previous table can be found in Ballesteros-Perez (2015b). 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analyzed how different aspects of the ESF condition bidders’ bidding 
behavior and bid dispersion.  Particularly, aspects related to the weights of the economic and 
technical criteria have been described and a phenomenon that affects them (phony economic bid 
weighting) formulated mathematically.  Also, the variables that ESF implement:  the Scoring 
Parameters have been classified and the effects of using one, two or even none SP qualitatively 
classified.  Further research is needed in this topic in the near future nonetheless, which looks 
quite relevant to optimize how public money is spent. 
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